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over many decades for aboriginal Kulin people in Victo-
ria, she also acquired huge tracts of their land.
The volume is somewhat unbalanced in terms of its na-
tional coverage. The book includes four articles on Aus-
tralia, three on Canada, two on South Africa, and one
each on New Zealand and the U.S. More attention to
New Zealand and the U.S. would be welcome, especially
since U.S. historians have lagged in analyzing the nation’s
settler colonial past.
The best essays in the volume take pains to link the
processes they describe to other colonial contexts. Angela
Wanhalla, for example, observes how settler colonialism
took a much less draconian form in New Zealand. Resi-
dents on the Taieri Native Reserve were not subject to
surveillance nor restricted to the reserve as she notes was
the case for so many Indigenous subjects in the U.S.,
Australia, and Canada.
Many of the essays in the volume consider how these
histories continue to exert influence today. The chapter
by Julie Evans and Giordano Nanni on Coranderrk
shows that when the Kulin brought their land claim to
court in Victoria, Australia, in 1998, a judge relied on the
nostalgic memoir of Edward Curr, a settler who had bla-
tantly dispossessed the Kulin, as evidence that the Kulin
had not continuously occupied their land, and thus were
not eligible to reclaim it.
It is hard not to get angry while reading this volume.
Author after author uncovers a confounding pattern—
Indigenous communities adapting to a new set of rules,
winning the game, and then settler societies changing the
rulebook. As Sarah Carter sums up, “it was profitable to
insist that Aboriginal people were incapable agricultural-
ists . . . despite clear evidence to the contrary” (175).
By shuttling between the global and the local, this vol-
ume accomplishes something quite extraordinary. It
shows us the power and hegemony of settler colonial in-
stitutions in the late nineteenth century at the same time
as it uncovers the rich local histories of how Indigenous
people confronted dispossession and displacement.
MARGARET D. JACOBS
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN. Why Did Europe Conquer the World?
(The Princeton Economic History of the Western
World.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2015. Pp. 272. $29.95.
ROMAN STUDER. The Great Divergence Reconsidered: Eu-
rope, India, and the Rise to Global Economic Power.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xii,
231. $99.00.
Global history and large-scale comparative history now
enjoy a place of prominence in a discipline that for a gen-
eration has been dominated by very different agendas.
The contemporary reality of a globalized world and the
influence of the Great Divergence thesis have inspired a
stream of stimulating new historical studies. Simultane-
ously, they have forced historians to consider anew the
place of social science theories and quantitative methods
in their discipline. Studies of a global scope often require
the use of sources and methods that most historians have
not considered since the onset of the “cultural turn.” The
two books reviewed here offer a nice demonstration of
what a discipline that hopes to participate in this new his-
torical discourse must be prepared to incorporate into its
portfolio of research methods.
Roman Studer’s book bears a title that might be
thought a bit too grand for its actual subject matter, but it
provides a fine illustration of how large theses in Eur-
asian history can actually be tested with specific historical
data. Studer takes on the core Great Divergence claim of
pre-1800 equivalence in economic performance among
the major economies of Eurasia. How can that claim be
tested? Studer reasons that an economy’s overall level of
development can be measured by the extent of its market
integration. There can be no significant division of labor
(Adam Smith’s measure of development) without mar-
kets integrated over an extensive area that allow for spe-
cialization among producers and that convey the fruits of
this specialization to consumers via lower and more sta-
ble prices. Therefore, if the Great Divergence claim can
be given credence, the price behavior of markets for basic
commodities such as wheat and rice should reveal com-
parable levels of integration. Studer proceeds to test this
proposition for market prices in Europe and India.
In order to describe and analyze the market prices for
these two locales, Studer employs techniques long used
by economists. Economists have relied on standard statis-
tical tests for market integration: coefficients of correla-
tion measure co-movement between pairs of price series;
coefficients of variation measure the volatility of price se-
ries; price convergence (a reduction of price differentials
between price series) measures the reduction of the fric-
tion of transaction costs on markets; and, finally, error
correlation models measure the speed with which a given
market responds to a disequilibrating price shock.
In order to successfully conduct this investigation,
Studer needed reliable data stretching back into the early
modern era—long, unbroken series of annual average
prices—for the two subcontinents. European price data
are abundant, although Studer enriches his study with
Swiss data in order to de-emphasize the advanced mar-
kets of northwest Europe as a comparator. His main his-
torical challenge was to locate and properly utilize the far
scarcer Indian market prices. This review cannot supply a
full evaluation of the comparability of the Indian price re-
cords to those available for most of Europe. Studer lo-
cated fifty-four Indian price series, although the pre-
nineteenth-century series remain scarce and the annual
data seem often to be based on very few observations.
The data are not ideal, but they far exceed what has hith-
erto been available. Moreover, Studer takes care in his
statistical analyses to “handicap” the more abundant and
fine-grained European data so as to avoid reaching re-
sults that are simply a reflection of differences in data
density and quality.
Studer walks his reader through the statistical tech-
niques and offers intuitive interpretations that should be
accessible to any interested reader. His findings are clear
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and appear robust: Indian grain markets showed very low
levels of integration by every measure used until after the
mid-nineteenth century. Before then India’s grain trade
was essentially local; annual price fluctuations were ex-
tremely high (two to four times higher than in European
markets); differences in price levels between markets
were pronounced and persistent, and prices between
market pairs were essentially uncorrelated. European
markets reveal a fairly steady increase in integration
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and,
indeed, from the early seventeenth century. By Studer’s
measures, the Great Divergence between Europe and In-
dia “needs to be shifted back to the seventeenth century,
if not earlier” (182). Nearly as remarkable as the poor in-
tegration of Indian markets before the mid-nineteenth
century is Studer’s finding of rapid improvement in all his
indicators thereafter, reaching a rough parity with Euro-
pean standards by 1900. Our confidence in the benefits to
India of “Smithian growth” would be greater if the evi-
dence for market integration had been paired with a re-
duction in the incidence of famines. These seem only to
have intensified, which suggests that there is more to the
process of market integration than Studer has been able
to tell. But his book is to be recommended as a clear and
accessible example of recasting a grand historical claim
as a testable proposition, assembling the needed evi-
dence, and deploying relevant statistical methods to con-
duct fair tests. As things now stand, it is hard to see how
the claim of economic equivalence between India, or ad-
vanced parts of India, and Europe, or even its mountain-
ous Helvetic zone, can be sustained.
Philip T. Hoffman’s impressive book offers a very dif-
ferent kind of analytical history. His title, WhyDid Europe
Conquer the World?, refers to military rather than eco-
nomic achievement, and while he assembles quantitative
data to support some of his claims, the heart of his study
is an application of game theory to the behavior of rulers
and, hence, to the question posed in the book’s title.
Europe, Hoffman argues, “conquered the world” be-
cause it mastered better than rivals elsewhere the “gun-
powder technologies”—the firearms, artillery, armed
ships, bombardment-resistant fortifications, and associ-
ated organizational methods and tactics—that spread
across Eurasia from late medieval times. If rulers across
Eurasia all had access to and made use of gunpowder
technologies, why did the Europeans alone come to excel
in those technologies’ further development and effective
use?
Hoffman’s approach to this big historical question is to
search for a model of competitive behavior that can be
applied to differentiate among Eurasia’s many bellicose
polities. European rulers, he concludes, did not simply
compete with each other—this was true everywhere—but
they engaged in a special, intensive form of competition
akin to a tournament. He then develops a formal tourna-
ment model to predict the behavior of participants (rul-
ers) who faced all of its incentives and constraints, and
the behavior of rulers who confronted historical situa-
tions in which one or more of the tournament’s condi-
tions were absent. In short, Hoffman has taken an enor-
mous question, reduced it to its essential elements, and
fashioned a model consistent with these elements.
A tournament differs from ordinary competitive be-
havior in its intensity. The prize to the winner must be
valuable and indivisible (so that compromise or “partial
victory” is unavailable); the cost of mobilizing the re-
sources needed to be competitive must be low (the rulers
must not face a hegemon enjoying overwhelming
strength who makes the cost of competition prohibitive);
and the rulers engaged in tournaments over time must
make use of the same military technology (warfare
against nomadic horsemen and archers diverts resources
and attention from the development of gunpowder tech-
nology). Standing behind these conditions is the exis-
tence and maintenance over time of a fragmented politi-
cal space in which the warring states are of commensu-
rate size, and where the participating rulers can vie for
victory without fearing complete extinction in the case of
defeat.
Hoffman’s achievement is to develop a formal tourna-
ment model that incorporates these elements. He de-
scribes it intuitively in the text, reserving the mathemati-
cal notation for appendixes. He is then able to show that
the incentives and constraints facing participants in the
“games” of his model will lead to the devotion of more
resources to warfare and more attention to the develop-
ment of infrastructures of resource mobilization. Military
technology continues to evolve until the nineteenth cen-
tury, when Hoffman’s model must be adjusted somewhat
via “learning by doing.” That is, a state can only improve
its gunpowder technologies by experience in war, specifi-
cally in war against enemies using the same technology.
Outside Europe, rulers often fought against archers on
horseback and/or faced a hegemon, both of which diluted
the flow of resources to warfare and the learning process.
It also affected the associated development of state insti-
tutions for resource mobilization. To a greater extent
(China, Japan, and India) or a lesser one (Russia and the
Ottoman Empire), all non-European polities ineluctably
fell behind in military technology because of the different
incentives they faced in making decisions about how
to engage in war. They were not less belligerent but
“learned” less from their warfare.
Hoffman now has the answer to his question, but only
a proximate answer. He stresses that the “ultimate
causes” of the tournament model’s applicability to Eu-
rope reside in its political history. By this he means some-
thing rather different from what a traditional political
historian would expect. This is not a history tossed about
by unrestrained contingency, but a set of political prac-
tices and interests (emerging from the Germanic tribes,
Carolingian institutions, and papal ambitions) that con-
geal to set society on a “path-dependent” course. Such a
course is not immutable, but tends to reinforce itself over
time. In short, Hoffman’s political history is a causal force
in its own right. It sets the framework in which the rulers
faced, generation after generation, game after game, a
set of incentives that encouraged them to fight for the
prizes, invest in the “fixed cost” of fiscal systems and mili-
tary establishments, and expend vast resources on war-
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fare. They thereby advanced the proficiency of their mili-
tary technologies, but in Hoffman’s telling, they advanced
much more than that. Via learning by doing the Euro-
pean states also developed the fiscal and political institu-
tions that made the tournaments possible.
To return to economic history: Did Europe’s develop-
ment of military superiority over the rest of the world
make it rich? Does conquest and the threat of conquest
account for Europe’s “primitive accumulation of capital”
and later industrial revolution? Hoffman, who extends
his model to incorporate nineteenth-century develop-
ments, sees a rather different connection between mili-
tary power and economic development. For him, the
path-dependent political history referred to above is
jointly responsible for both Europe’s growing military su-
periority and the economic success that reveals itself ulti-
mately in the industrial revolution. Following very differ-
ent paths and using very different methods, Hoffman and
Studer offer a single answer to the question of when the
economic paths of Europe diverged from the rest of Eur-
asia. The differences revealed around 1800 were the
product neither of recent nor of fortuitous events, but
were the product of deep differences of long standing.
Neither of these studies is without problems. But both
make very substantial contributions that historians
should take seriously. Nonetheless, doing so will require
engaging with the methodologies that have given their
authors the capacity to address major questions in global
comparative history.
JAN DE VRIES
University of California, Berkeley
ASIA
DAVID A. JOHNSON. New Delhi: The Last Imperial City.
(Britain and the World.) New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2015. Pp. xv, 261. Cloth $95.00, e-book $69.99.
Over the last decade or so, Delhi has been the focus of a
growing body of historical research (most notably, Jyoti
Hosagrahar, Indigenous Modernities: Negotiating Architec-
ture and Urbanism [2005]; Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colo-
nialism: Delhi’s Urban Governmentalities [2007]; and
Awadhendra Saran, In the City, Out of Place: Nuisance,
Pollution, and Dwelling in Delhi, c .1850–2000 [2014]).
David A. Johnson’s study differs significantly from this
historiography in its focus and approach, examining the
creation of New Delhi against the wider backdrop of Brit-
ain’s global empire in the early twentieth century. The
decision to invest in this project, Johnson argues, was
made in “response to the global challenges of a new geo-
political reality in which Britain was just one among
many powerful industrial states” (5). Bringing about a
closer alignment of British and Indian interests became a
pressing political challenge for the imperial elite at this
juncture. Hence, New Delhi “displayed a double narra-
tive of promised liberation and continued colonial depen-
dence.” It was simultaneously a “site of traditional impe-
rial authority” and a “symbol of Britain’s willingness to
address, and thus hopefully control, the political de-
mands of its Indian subjects” (6).
Johnson thus frames the history of New Delhi as “a
British imperial story set in India” (12). The first part of
the book (chaps. 2–4) delineates the internal debates
within the imperial establishment regarding the decision
to relocate the capital of British India from Calcutta to
Delhi. These debates represented two rival conceptions
of Britain’s Indian empire. Those who supported a new
capital argued that the rising tide of Indian nationalism
called for a more inclusive approach to governance and
the granting of strategic concessions to educated Indians.
New Delhi was an opportunity to reset the course of Brit-
ish rule in India “along safe and sound lines” by increas-
ing the representation of natives in the council chambers
of government (51). But these ambitious plans were furi-
ously opposed in and out of Parliament by the old India
hands, for whom the decision was a stark acknowledg-
ment of the British failure to deal forcefully with Indian
nationalists. The new capital’s cost and its potentially ad-
verse impact on financial markets in India and London
also triggered heated arguments in Parliament about
“the place of India in Britain’s global system of trade”
(82).
The second part of the book (chaps. 5–7) highlights
the contradictions and conflicts that marked the making
of the new capital. One bone of contention was its loca-
tion. The planning committee unexpectedly rejected the
existing area of British settlement, the “Civil Lines” north
of old Delhi. Among the factors that influenced the com-
mittee’s decision were perceived natural and manmade
restrictions on future growth; the belief that the more
northern location was more vulnerable to outbreaks of
malaria; and a reluctance to build on an old Delhi site
where the bitter memories of India’s 1857 uprising and
its repression had not entirely faded (87). Yet the desire
to forge a new compact with Indian society was undercut
by the authoritarian impulses that drove the project. For
one, the crucial decisions about the construction of the
capital were taken by Britain’s viceroy Lord Hardinge
(110). Hardinge’s choice of Edward Lutyens as the prin-
cipal architect was to cause him “a tremendous amount
of anguish” on account of the latter’s open contempt for
Indian architecture (122). When the principal buildings
of the new capital were finally completed, their amalgam
of Western structural forms and Indian decorative motifs
reproduced in stone the unequal relationship between
the metropole and the colony.
The final chapter shows how land acquisition reflected
the iniquities of colonial political economy. Customary
rights of landless peasants were ignored and many of the
Indian farmers in the areas earmarked for New Delhi
lost their lands and livelihoods while large agrarian prop-
erty owners benefited. At first, the colonial authorities
sought to compensate smaller landowners with tracts of
land elsewhere, but doctrinaire adherence to free market
principles eventually led colonial authorities to merely re-
serve lands for dispossessed Delhi gentry who wished to
purchase them. Ironically, then, even though reform-
minded colonial officials “had become convinced that
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